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Appellant Quicken Loans fu.c. submits the following points and authorities in reply to the
arguments in the Respondent's Brief filed on October 21, 2019.
1. The District Court erred in ruling that the Knights, and thus MERS and Quicken
Loans Inc. were not protected under the Shelter Rule.

Nampa Highway District did not dispute the law of the Shelter Rule. Instead, its only
argument that the Shelter Rule does not apply is that Howard Lupton and/or the Downs were not
bonafide purchasers. But Nampa Highway District's only argument that Howard Lupton and/or
the Downs are not bona fide purchasers is that Lupton and the Downs cannot be because the only
way to prove that Howard Lupton or the Downs 1

had no knowledge of the unrecorded

conveyance is through direct testimony. (Respondent's Brief at 19). Nampa Highway District's
logic is that, because the Appellants bear the initial burden of proof in establishing there were
bonafide purchasers in the chain of title, the absence of such direct testimony is fatal to the
Appellant's position. But that position is not legally supportable and is contrary to the rules of
evidence.
There is no rule that direct testimony from purported bonafide purchasers is indispensable
evidence to establish their knowledge.

Rather, such knowledge can be established by any

relevant evidence, i.e. anything that "has any tendency to make a fact more or less probably than
it would be without the evidence[.]" IRE 40l(a). See, for example, State v. Betancourt,2 (where
the Idaho Supreme Court established that even blood test evidence can be used to establish
defendant's knowledge).
In this case, the evidence of Howard Lupton and the Downs' actual knowledge can be
established by the information that was presented to and available to them. The evidence in

1Howard Lupton and/or
the Downs were owners of the property at issue before the recording of the deed. R. p 269,
para 6.
2
151 Idaho 635, 262 P.3d 278 (Ct. App. 2011).

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT QUICKEN LOANS INC. 'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 1

record, and previously discussed, is: (1) the physical boundaries of W. Orchard Ave3 ; (2) the
deeds presented to and signed by Howard Lupton and the Downs4; and (3) the lack of any
recording of the conveyance to Nampa Highway District in the public records at the relevant
time 5 • None of the evidence shows that Howard Lupton or Downs had any information that
would lead to actual knowledge of the transfer to Nampa Highway District. Given this evidence,
it is clear that Lupton and the Downs were bonafide purchasers, and as such, the Knights (and
Quicken Loans and MERS) are protected under the Shelter Rule.

2. The District Court erred in finding that Howard Lupton and/or the Downs had
constructive notice of a deeded right of wav extending 22 feet bevond the edge of W.
Orchard Ave.
Appellants have previously explained the factual and legal reasons why there should be
no constructive notice of a right of way beyond the physical boundaries of W. Orchard Ave. 6
Nampa Highway District, for the first time on appeal, now asserts that all parties should have had
constructive notice that all highways are deemed not less than 50 feet wide, regardless of the
physical roadway.
While the Court will allow parties to "evolve" issues that have been raised below,7 there
are limits. The State v. Gonzalez Court explained the difference between being permitted to
evolve an argument on appeal and the prohibition against an entirely new position on appeal
(like Nampa Highway District has done):
To be clear, both the issue and the party's position on the issue must be raised
before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal. In other
words, Brooke View portrays a party riding on a horse that has been groomed and
reshod for the appellate process, whereas Garcia-Rodriguez exemplifies a party
entering the appellate process riding a similar-looking but entirely new horse. A
groomed horse is expected on appeal, but a different horse is forbidden.8
3

R. p. 406.
R. p. 475; R. pp. 262-63, 272; p. 388, p. 272,367, 388-89; p 269, 281-82.
5 R. p. 323-24,
331-32.
6 Appellants
Opening Br. P. 10-11.
7 Ada Cty.
Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n. 2, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n. 2 (2017).
8
165 Idaho 95,439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019).

4

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT QUICKEN LOANS INC'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 2

Although Nampa Highway District has argued constructive notice throughout the case, its
argument based upon the legal definitions of the width of highways that is set forth in LC. 402312 and its predecessor statutes 9 is a "similar-looking but entirely new horse." The reason is
because Nampa Highway District is not using the statutes to flesh out the legal substance of
arguments that have previously been asserted. Rather, it is being used to embellish the factual
record because the statute is being used as evidence to change their argument. Respondent's
original theory was the Knights had constructive knowledge because the Knights could
physically see the highway's limits and could review the recorded right-of-way deed, and thus
were on notice of its boundaries. The Respondent's new argument is that the Knights had
constructive knowledge because of a previously undisclosed statute. The result has the effect of
changing Nampa Highway District's requested relief from a 33-foot wide strip of land to a 50foot wide strip of land. Namp·a Highway District is attempting to argue evidence on appeal that
was not presented to the district court. Under the facts of this case, Nampa Highway District
should be prevented from raising such a new argument given the prejudice to the Appellants.
Notwithstanding, to the extent the Court considerers the new argument, the statutory
definition of 50-foot wide highways does not justify Nampa Highway District's argument that it
can avoid the consequences of the Recording Act. First, even assuming that LC. 40-2312(2)
does impose some constructive notice, it would only do so to the extent the total width of the
highway was 50-feet, which would be 25 feet on each side of the centerline. In this case, the
unrecorded Right of Way Deed granted 33 feet from the center line of the highway. 10 There
could be no constructive notice of the total 33-foot width. At least eight feet of the strip of land

9 Rev. Stat. ofldaho 937 (1887), LC. 39-601 (1933), and I.C. 40-701 (1966).
JO R. p. 331-32.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT QUICKEN LOANS INC'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 3

identified within the unrecorded Right of Way Deed falls outside the bounds of any possible
constructive notice.
Second, the statute does not actually define roadways constructed under these
circumstances to be 50 feet wide. Idaho Code 40-2312 was enacted in 1985. Critically, the Road
at issue was created in 1921 when Nampa Highway District built W. Orchard Avenue over a
strip ofland along the front of the Property. I1 W. Orchard Avenue only occupies the front eleven
(11) feet of the Property. I2 In 1921, the Idaho statute defining the width of highways said, in
total "(a]ll highways, except alleys and bridges and streets located within townsites, must be not
less than 50 feet wide and not to exceed 100 feet wide, except those now existing of a different
width." 13 At this time, the apparent practice was for public entities to lay out and maintain streets
for the prescriptive period to acquire an easement by adverse possession. 14 Such highways,
notwithstanding the statute, only had the width "reasonably necessary for the reasonable
convenience of the traveling public ... such width must be determined from a consideration of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." 15 Although the statute is a factor, it is not
dispositive.
In this case, nearly one hundred years after the creation of the road, it is no more than 22

feet wide (11 feet on each side of the center line). 16 Occupation sufficient to establish adverse
possession under an oral claim of title requires enclosure or usual cultivation or improvement.
I.C. 5-210. Nampa Highway District must establish that by clear and satisfactory evidence. 17

11

R. p. 325, para. 9 a-c.
R. p. 406.
13
Because the statute is not current, the 1919 version of the statute (Compiled Statutes ofldaho Title 11, sec. 1350)
is attached as Exhibit A to this brief, and the 1932 version of the statute (Idaho Code§ 39-601) is attached as
Exhibit B. The language in both versions is identical.
14 Meservey
v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 144, 93 P. 780, 783 (1908) ("The public use ofa highway for the statutory
period and the keeping of it in repair at the public expense is all that is necessary to establish it as a highway.")
15 14 Idaho
at 148, 93 P. at 785.
16
R. p. 406.
17
Swanson v. State, 83 Idaho 126, 133,358 P.2d 387, 391 (1960); Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,443,690 P.2d
896, 898 (1984).
12
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Inquiry notice of the law incident to the existence of the roadway does not give notice
beyond the bounds of the roadway. The 50-foot statutory designation of the highway width is
not binding on an adversely possessed easement. The only evidence of use or enclosure is that of
the 11 feet of pavement on the property. The District Court erred concluding that there was
constructive notice beyond the boundaries of the highway. Further, even if the Court believes
that the statute did give constructive notice of a 50-foot wide strip of land for the freeway, it is
clear that the State ofldaho waived the right to any 50-foot highway by only asking for a 33 foot
wide strip of land and confirming the same in writing in the Right of Way Deed. 18
3. The District Court erred by finding that the Nampa Highway District owns the 33
feet of land in fee simple. If Nampa Highwav District has any property interest, it is
an easement.

Nampa Highway District responds that Appellants did not raise the argument, below, that
Nampa Highway District's interest, if anything, is an easement. While that is true, it is equally
true that Nampa Highway District did not assert its arguments, either.
Nampa Highway District offered no argument or authority to support its claim of fee
simple title in its memorandum in support of its summary judgment motions, or its reply in
support of its motion. 19 On review, a district court decision will not be upheld on a legal theory
that was not properly presented by either party below. "[T]he theory on which the lower court
decides the issue must not reroute the course of proceedings so that the alternate base does not
have a chance to be litigated. That is, the affected party must have the reason and the opportunity
to properly respond to the alternate grounds."20 Nampa Highway District's bald request for "fee

18

Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct. App. 1987) (discussing waiver of
claims).
19
R. pp. 344 - 352; 468 - 4 72. Likewise, the issue was not raised by Nampa Highway District in its response to
Knights, Quicken Loans Inc.'s or Dominguezes summary judgments. (R. pp. 451-60.)
20
State v. Hoskins, 443 P.3d 231,236 (Idaho 2019) (analyzing whether to apply the "right result, wrong theory
doctrine.)
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simple" title in its motion, without argument, does not constitute argument of a theory. 21 It is
well recognized that "[t]o properly preserve an issue for appellate review, 'both the issue and the
party's position on the issue must be raised before the trial court .... "'22

Because Nampa

Highway District never argued its claim for fee simple title, below, and the court, basically,
made the finding at its own direction, the first opportunity for the appellants to address the legal
underpinnings has been on appeal. Nampa Highway District should not be allowed the benefit of
a ruling on a theory that it did not properly advance. 23
The only substantive response to the Appellants' argument that the interest conveyed, if
any, is that of an easement, is to distinguish one case, Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 507, 65
P.3d 525, 529 (2003).

Respondent argues that in Neider v. Shaw, the deed at issue in that case

used the language "right of way." 24 Nampa Highway District misreads Neider v. Shaw. In that
case, the Supreme Court was examining a roadway dedicated to the public on a plat when it
stated that the public dedication of a roadway creates an easement, not fee simple. 25 Tellingly,
the Idaho Supreme Court did not arrive at its conclusion because of the specific language of the
deed. Instead, it cited to case law and the Idaho Code in support of its general rule and broad
proposition that land dedicated for public use only creates an easement:
When land is dedicated as a street for public use, the landowner owns to the center of the
street and the public acquires an easement, not a title in fee simple. Id. at 682-83, 107 P.
at 400-01 (citing Idaho Rev. Code § 3091 (1908)) (current version with amendments at
Idaho Code§ 55-309 (2002)). 26
In addition, further research has clarified that the road established by adverse possession,

as this one was in 1921, only established an easement, as a matter of law. "All the right acquired
21

Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604,613,364 P.3d 951,960 (2015) (rejecting arguments Plaintiff only asserted in
caption).
22
Id. ( citations omitted).
23 Obenchain v. McA/vain
Const., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443,444 (2006) (appellate courts will not
consider new arguments raised for the first time on appeal).
24 Respondent's
Br. p. 19.
25 138
Idaho at 507, 65 P.3d at 529.
26
138 Idaho at 507, 65 P.3d at 529.
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by the public is an easement in the land consisting of a right to pass over the same and keep the
road in repair.'m
Lastly, if Nampa Highway District was to obtain title in fee simple, its title would
constitute an illegal taking and it would need to compensate Appellants for its taking. 28
In substance, Nampa Highway District presents no contrary legal reason for it to have
acquired fee simple title. The Appellants have presented the most compelling and justifiable
case for reversing the district court's finding of title in fee simple. As such, Appellants
respectfully request that the Supreme Court reverse the order of the trial court and remand for
further proceedit :onsistent with Appellant's briefing.
DATED this

rZ

day of November, 2019.

27

Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho at 144, 93 P. at 783 (Discussing ownership ofland over which a highway passes).
Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216,233, 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1418, 155 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2003).
("When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a
categorical duty to compensate the former owner ... Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken and
the government occupies the property for its own purposes ... ").
28
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